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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 




KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Lisa Ellis appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her 
former employer, BNY Mellon, on her Title VII race discrimination claim.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm.1 
I. Discussion2 
We analyze Ellis’s claim under the familiar three-step framework articulated 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  A plaintiff must first 
establish “a prima facie case of . . . discrimination,” id.; if she succeeds, “[t]he burden then 
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee’s rejection,” id.; and if the employer does so, the plaintiff must then demonstrate 
that the “stated reason[s] for [her] rejection [were] in fact pretext” for discrimination, id. at 
804.  Ellis stumbles at the first step. 
 To make out a prima facie case, Ellis must show: (1) she is qualified for her position, 
(2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse employment action 
 
1 Ellis also raises a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  This claim is 
subject to the same standards as her Title VII claim, and it fails for the same reasons.  See 
Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
2 The District Court retained jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we wield 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the grant of summary judgment de novo 
and will affirm if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and if, viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to Ellis, BNY Mellon is nonetheless “entitled to judgment 





gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.3  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 
F.3d 403, 410–11 (3d Cir. 1999).  The parties do not dispute that Ellis was qualified for her 
role at BNY Mellon and that her firing constitutes an adverse action.  All that remains is to 
decide if Ellis has established the discrimination element. 
In challenging the District Court’s determination that she presented “no evidence of 
racial discrimination,” Ellis relies on comparator evidence.  J.A. at 24.  More specifically, 
she spotlights two BNY Mellon employees who, like Ellis, shared controversial social 
media posts.  In her view, a reasonable factfinder could see BNY Mellon’s decision to 
retain those two employees, who are black, and remove Ellis, who is white, as evidence of 
discrimination.   
But to support an inference of discrimination, a comparator must be “similarly 
situated” to Ellis in all material respects, and neither purported comparator satisfies that 
standard.  In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 403 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).  
What matters most is that Ellis’s social media post was far more egregious—and far more 
likely to harm BNY Mellon’s reputation.  In response to a news story about a man who 
faced criminal charges for driving his car into a crowd of protesters, Ellis commented:  
“Total BS.  Too bad he didn[’]t have a bus to plow thr[ough].”  J.A. at 89.  Neither 
supposedly-similar employee said anything as extreme.  One expressed frustration with a 
white co-worker but did not threaten that co-worker with violence, let alone serious bodily 
harm or death.  The other opined that men who hurt women should commit suicide.  
 
3 As a reverse-race-discrimination plaintiff, Ellis need not show she is a member of 
a minority group.  See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).   
4 
 
Though inappropriate and ill-advised, neither post encouraged mass violence against 
protesters, as Ellis’s did.  Thus, no reasonable jury could find Ellis’s conduct comparable 
to that of her former colleagues.   
Other material distinctions further separate Ellis from the supposed comparators.  
As the District Court recognized, the two black employees “worked in different positions, 
in different departments, had different responsibilities, and reported to different supervisors 
than Ellis did.”  Id. at 23.  Ellis counters that none of these differences matter because all 
BNY Mellon employees must adhere to the same social media policy.  This argument might 
carry some force if the policy prescribed standard punishments, regardless of who a 
violator is or where she works, but instead it gives decision-makers “broad discretion” over 
how to discipline employees.  Crawford v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844, 
847 (7th Cir. 2006).  That leaves open the possibility that Ellis’s position, department, or 
responsibilities factored into BNY Mellon’s decision to fire her.  And it is Ellis’s burden, 
not BNY Mellon’s, to dispel this possibility and establish that the purported comparators 
are, in fact, comparable.   See Jones, 198 F.3d at 410.  Having failed to do so, and having 
presented no other evidence of discrimination, Ellis cannot support a prima facie case.  
II. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in BNY Mellon’s favor. 
 
  
